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Alienation or Cooperation? British Muslims’ Attitude to and Engagement in Counter-
Terrorism and Counter-Extremism 
 
Abstract: 
The dominant academic narrative portrays British Muslim communities as alienated by 
counter-terrorism policies and consequently reluctant to cooperate with authorities by taking 
action against Islamist extremism. This article reassesses and nuances the “alienation 
narrative” with the use of unique data from three robust surveys of British Muslims. It finds 
that although a minority shows signs of alienation, most British Muslims are satisfied with 
and trust counter-terrorism policies as well as the government and the police. The level of 
willingness to take action against Islamist extremism is also high. The study confirms that 
aspects of alienation correlate with reduced willingness to take action against Islamist 
extremism, although they do not necessarily lead to disengagement. 
 




Since the Terrorism Act 2000, the UK government has enacted various counter-terrorism1 
legislation primarily in response to the growing threat of Islamist terrorism. This legislation 
has progressively broadened the scope of terrorism-related offences, increased the power of 
state security agencies and involved more actors (including non-governmental) in counter-
terrorism efforts.2 Counter-terrorism has shifted markedly into the preventative, pre-crime 
space, which is the domain of Prevent, one of the four main strands of CONTEST, the UK 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Further widening of the security net is evidenced by the passage 
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of the UK Counter-Extremism Strategy in 2015, which “commits the Government to 
addressing all the broader harms that extremism can cause, not just where it may lead to 
terrorism.” 3 
Responding to this development, a continuous stream of academic literature argues that 
British counter-terrorism and counter-extremism policies have alienated Muslim 
communities.4 According to this dominant narrative, Muslims feel stigmatized, isolated, 
angry, afraid, and distrustful of authorities. Some researchers have used the concept suspect 
community to describe the position of Muslims in Britain in the context of counter-terrorism.5 
Membership in a suspect community entails, among other things, feelings of fear6 and “deep 
resentment”7, which are thought to “undermine security” due to Muslims’ social and political 
disengagement8, or even radicalization.9 Both disengagement and radicalization imply non-
cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism. Some studies are even more explicit in linking 
Muslim alienation to reduced willingness to cooperate in counter-terrorism (for example with 
respect to intelligence sharing).10 
This is problematic in terms of social cohesion but also in light of the mantra 
“communities defeat terrorism” that underpins the UK government counter-terrorism efforts. 
This approach can be illustrated by the following two quotes. In response to the 7/7 London 
bombings in 2005, then Prime Minister Tony Blair opined that “[i]n the end, government 
itself cannot go and root out the extremism in these communities. […] It’s better that we 
mobilise the Islamic community itself to do this.”11 The same underlying idea was expressed 
by Ian Blair, then head of the UK Metropolitan Police: “It will not be the police and 
intelligence services that defeat terrorism, it will be communities.”12 Engaging Muslim 
communities in counter-terrorism has since been one of the purported aims of the UK 
government.13 If counter-terrorism and counter-extremism policies alienate Muslim 
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communities, they might have limited interest in helping the government to “defeat 
terrorism”.  
However, the vast majority of studies that point to the alienation thesis rely on either 
purely theoretical accounts or empirical data from small-N qualitative research. While rich, 
in-depth data obtained through qualitative methods are certainly valuable, especially for 
investigating the impacts of counter-terrorism on particular sections of Muslim communities, 
it is difficult to generalize from them to the larger population. It is even more difficult to make 
judgements about the level of actual or potential engagement in counter-terrorism activities 
among Muslims. In fact, the few existing quantitative studies indicate that trust in the 
government14 and the police15 is higher among British Muslims than among the majority 
population, the level of “political alienation” is comparable or lower among Muslims than in 
the rest of society16 and Muslims show very high levels of readiness to take action against 
Islamist extremism.17 
The objective of this article is to reassess and nuance the widespread assumption about 
Muslim alienation and Muslims’ willingness to engage in counter-terrorism. This is achieved 
by: a) outlining the core arguments of the dominant narrative of Muslim alienation; b) 
introducing new quantitative data that allow for a more rigorous assessment of the extent of 
Muslim alienation, willingness to engage in counter-terrorism/counter-extremism and the 
relationship between alienation and engagement. 
The study focuses on Muslims living in the United Kingdom, but its findings have wider 
implications for other Western countries with a similar context. The British preventative and 
community-focused approach has become a source of inspiration to countries such as the US, 
Australia, Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark,18 while worries about Muslim alienation due 
to excessive securitization and widespread anti-Muslim sentiments and discrimination have 
been expressed in almost every Western country with sizable Muslim minorities. This article 
5 
thus contributes to the research on the reaction to and engagement in counter-terrorism of 
Muslim communities in the UK and in the West by supplying much needed quantitative data 
with higher external validity. It situates the existing qualitative in-depth studies within a larger 
picture of Muslims’ attitudes and behaviour regarding counter-terrorism and it tests the 
assumed connection between Muslims’ alienation and reduced willingness to engage in 
counter-terrorism.   
The remainder of the article is organized in five sections. The first section outlines the core 
arguments of the dominant narrative of Muslim alienation. The second section specifies the 
sources of my data and their use in the analysis. The third section presents the findings in 
three parts, which mirror the core arguments of the alienation narrative. The first part 
investigates British Muslims’ attitudes to counter-terrorism policies and other potential 
indicators of alienation; the second part sheds light on the extent of Muslims’ intended and 
actual engagement in counter-terrorism/counter-extremism; the third part analyses whether 
alienation correlates with reduced willingness to take action against Islamist extremism. The 
fourth section discusses the findings and their limitations. The fifth section summarizes the 
findings and suggests areas for further research.  
 
The Narrative of Muslim Alienation 
The alienation narrative can be summed up in two core arguments. The first argument 
suggests that Muslims’ attitude to counter-terrorism and counter-extremism policies is 
predominantly negative in terms of dissatisfaction with these policies and distrust of 
authorities (mainly the police and government). The second argument, less often explicitly 
articulated, holds that this negative attitude translates into limited willingness to cooperate in 
counter-terrorism. Below, I review both components of the alienation narrative. 
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Negative Attitude to Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Extremism Policies 
As noted in the introduction, the prevailing view of the recent (Conservative) UK 
governments has been that non-violent extremism is linked to violent extremism and 
terrorism.19 Hence, preventing non-violent extremism among Muslim communities is thought 
to mitigate domestic Islamist terrorism. Muslims, therefore, have to contend with both 
counter-terrorism security measures and broader efforts by the state to “superimpose a mono-
cultural framework” on them.20  
Before the War on Terror, Muslim communities were described as “already beleaguered” 
due to widespread racism and socio-economic deprivation.21 It is argued that the increased 
focus on Muslims after 9/11 made things even worse. A number of studies report negative 
impact of post-9/11 security measures on Muslims living in the West.22 In Britain, Muslims 
have been subjected to increased profiling, surveillance, and security checks at points of entry 
to the country, stop and search policies, highly mediatized police house raids, long pre-charge 
detention, deportation, control orders, financial scrutiny, passport confiscations and other 
counter-terrorism measures. Although some of these measures concern only few individuals, 
the argument goes that because of the extensive social networks of those who experience 
them, the impact of the measures, and the dominant media, political and civil society 
discourses, Muslim communities at large feel alienated, stigmatized and under siege.23  
For example, extensive qualitative research by Blackwood and colleagues24 that mainly 
focused on the experiences of British Muslims at UK airports reported “ubiquitous feeling of 
rejection, of hurt and of humiliation”.25 According to their studies, Muslims experienced, due 
to perceived unwarranted treatment by authorities, denial and misrecognition of valued 
identities and loss of agency and autonomy associated with various degrees of alienation.26 
Among other things, the authors argued that this could result in a heightened sense of “us and 
them” polarization and a shift away from moderation to confrontation.27 
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Another example of the negative impacts of security measures on British Muslims is the 
use of the “stop and search” powers under now repealed Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 
2000, which allowed the police to stop and search individuals without any reasonable 
suspicion. Arguably, Muslims (or Muslim-looking individuals) found themselves 
disproportionally at the receiving part of this power, which eroded trust between them and the 
police and disenfranchised them socially and politically.28 Discrimination by the hands of the 
security apparatus can thus deepen already existing Muslim grievances generated by 
progressively more robust security responses to Islamist terrorism. The resulting “strong and 
enduring feeling of victimization”29 causes loss of trust in authorities30, particularly the 
government and the police. With it comes disengagement from these authorities31 and the 
political life in general32. 
Most scholars do not investigate the effects of security measures alone, but in combination 
with the political and public discourse as well as long-standing prejudices towards Muslims. 
For example, Bonino points out that by securitizing Muslim communities beyond particular 
individuals’ direct involvement in terrorism activities, the British state transposes 
Huntington’s clash of civilizations into the national context.33 Driven by a “security 
syndrome”, the British state relegates Muslims into the category of minority citizens “in a 
limbo”, where they live in fear in the permanent state of emergency.34 This, according to 
Bonino, only drives young alienated Muslims into the hands of extremist recruiters.35   
Other scholars too find that young Muslim men experience feelings of vulnerability, 
insecurity, frustration, and anger, because they are constructed by the security and intelligence 
services and public discourse as particularly risky in terms of terrorism.36 Some studies 
suggest that this creates a “chilling effect”, which means that young Muslims are less willing 
to voice their political opinions to avoid being labelled as extremists.37 Arguably, it can also 
lead to “defensive resentment”38 or even radicalization39. 
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It should be noted that there is no shared conceptualization of alienation across the studies 
mentioned above or attempts to define alienation within these studies. In addition, some 
researchers investigate the impact of particular components of counter-terrorism policies such 
as the Prevent Strategy40 or stop and search police practice in the UK41, while the focus is 
sometimes on particular subgroups of Muslims such as British Pakistanis42. At times, the 
conclusions of these studies are carefully phrased, for example noting that counter-terrorism 
policies “may have alienated sections of Muslim communities” (emphasis added).43 Some 
scholars also highlight the fact that there is no single Muslim monolithic experience of 
counter-terrorism policies and victimization caused by anti-Muslim hostility and 
discrimination in general44, pointing out the role of individual perceptions and social and 
psychological factors that likely result in different forms of recognizing and adapting to 
potential grievances.45 
However, despite such caveats and nuancing acts, we still know very little about how 
widespread alienation actually is in Muslim communities. One of the few quantitative studies 
of British Muslims’ political alienation concluded that British Muslims are equally, and on 
some indicators even less alienated than the non-Muslim population.46 The measure of 
alienation used in the study consisted of indicators of political attitudes and behaviour such as 
voting, trust in politicians, political efficacy, or satisfaction with democracy, and it was based 
on data from 2010. On these indicators, the non-alienated part of the British Muslim 
population was estimated to be between 60 and 70 % at the time. Another study, based on 
even older data from 2007, reports much higher levels of trust in the government among 
British Muslims than among Christians.47 This suggests that alienation of British Muslims 




Willingness to Engage in Counter-Terrorism 
Empirical data on the effect of alienation on Muslims’ counter-terrorism engagement is 
limited. Some scholars speculate that alienation reduces the willingness to engage. Vertigans 
writes that counter-terrorism policies and measures have “diminished the prospects of 
Muslims being willing to cooperate with police and security services.”48 Taylor claims that 
while many British Muslims might be alienated, the vast majority are not radicalized but 
“passively alienated.”49 Passive alienation, he argues, leads to “a disengagement from the 
everyday counter-terrorism aims prescribed to communities by successive UK 
governments.”50 Innes and colleagues argue that the erosion of trust between Muslims and the 
authorities reduces the willingness to pass community intelligence to the police51, although in 
a follow-up study52 they point out that Muslims’ reluctance to engage concerns cooperation 
with authorities rather than autonomous community actions. Finally, Thomas points out that 
counter-terrorism policies “may have created even further suspicion of, or an alienation from, 
the state, thereby damaging the ‘human intelligence’ vital to the defeat of domestic extremism 
and terrorism.”53 
Another reason to expect low engagement of ordinary Muslims in counter-terrorism is that 
their designation as “moderates” and government allies might place them in “an invidious 
position of being labelled as sell-outs and traitors by their own community.”54 The likelihood 
of Muslim counter-terrorism activists being labelled as sell-outs or otherwise ostracized by 
their own community is raised by several studies.55 Expounding on the reasons for ostracism, 
Grossman notes that Muslims will never be fully in charge of counter-terrorism policies.56 
They will remain “denizens in the realm of countering terrorism”, and so those who engage 
would function in “the well-worn structures of imperial control in the colonies, in which 
‘native’ administrators and local rulers […] were offered very limited forms of local 
power.”57 In a similar vein, Ragazzi describes Muslim counter-terrorism activists as “trusted 
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Muslims”, who “occupy a similar function to that of the local leaders trusted by colonial 
powers to properly carry out the demands of indirect rule.”58 
Nevertheless, some Muslim organization and individuals do engage in counter-terrorism, 
some of them even in overt cooperation with authorities, but little academic attention is 
devoted to this group. Some researchers note that these activists often creatively modify 
government policies on the ground, for example by giving projects more positive and less 
security-oriented names or by extending the focus to more general civic education or all forms 
of extremism, in the effort to avoid alienating Muslim communities.59 In the Australian 
context, Cherney and Hartley note how public statements made by politicians about the need 
for Muslims to fight Islamist extremism and prevent terrorism, which either directly or 
indirectly imply that Muslims are not doing enough, “quickly undermine [… ] the level of 
good will by passionate Muslims already engaged in the cause of counter-radicalisation.”60 
This would be particularly pertinent to Britain where such calls on Muslims are frequent. 
A few existing quantitative studies indirectly confirm aspects of the narrative about the 
negative impact of alienation on counter-terrorism engagement. Studies of American and 
British Muslims show that perceptions of police procedural justice are positively correlated 
with the willingness to cooperate in counter-terrorism policing.61 Another study of Australian 
Muslims found that the feeling of being unfairly targeted by counter-terrorism policies 
reduces the willingness to cooperate with the police and that this effect can be negated if the 
police uses procedural justice when dealing with Muslims.62 Importantly, the study shows that 
75 % of the sample reported a high sense of their community being targeted.  
Yet, the study also revealed that the mean scores for the “willingness to work with the 
police in community-based counter-terrorism efforts” and to “report suspicious terrorism-
related activities to police” were high (4.15 and 3.96, respectively, with the maximum mean 
score of 5). Similarly, a recent qualitative study by Thomas and colleagues on community 
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reporting showed that the majority of British Muslim participants are willing to contact the 
police with a concern about relatives or close friends.63 This suggests that Muslims’ 
reluctance to cooperate with the authorities might be exaggerated, which again calls for 
analyses of more representative data.  
 
Data and Methods 
This study draws on data collected in two original surveys (Survey 1 and Survey 2) of British 
Muslims conducted by the author and the UK Citizenship Survey 2010-2011, which was 
commissioned by the UK Department of Communities and Local Government. 
Survey 1 and Survey 2 were conducted in December 2017/January 2018 and 
October/November 2018, respectively, by the survey company Qualtrics. Both surveys used a 
non-probability sampling method using quota that reflected the British Muslim population 
with respect to gender and age. Because Muslims form a small minority in the UK (between 3 
and 5 percent), Qualtrics aggregated panels used by partner companies in addition to its own 
UK panel. The surveys were then offered to those panel members previously identified as 
Muslims. If they agreed to participate, they had to confirm whether they self-identified as 
Muslims (practicing or not) living in the UK. Apart from the quota on gender and age, 
measures were introduced to eliminate speeding respondents. The final participants were 
remunerated through Qualtrics panel scheme. Survey 1 had 825 respondents (430 men and 
395 women), and Survey 2 had 917 respondents (457 women and 460 men). The full sample 
characteristics of the surveys were reported in studies that had a different research objective: 
Survey 1 was used to investigate the role of action appeals and trust in Muslims’ collective 
action against Islamist extremism,64 and Survey 2 to investigate the impact of anti-Muslim 
discrimination on counter-extremism engagement65.   
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The UK Citizenship Survey 2010-11 offers older data, but it is included in the analysis 
because of its unique character. First, the survey includes a large nationally representative 
sample of British Muslims (n=3 491) along with 13 475 non-Muslims based on probability 
sampling, which allows for comparisons between the two groups. Second, it includes a battery 
of questions on actual past counter-extremism behaviour, which have not been systematically 
analysed in publicly accessible academic work. The data in this survey was collected by the 
companies Ipsos MORI and TNS-BMRB via face-to-face interviews in England and Wales 
between April 2010 and March 2011. An online technical report details the sample 
characteristics and the methodology of data collection.66 
The following analysis is therefore built on a cross-sectional research design, where the 
variables are related to both counter-terrorism (e.g. satisfaction with counter-terrorism 
policies) and counter-extremism (e.g. intended actions against a public lecture by an Islamist 
extremist). The first two parts of the analysis concerning the levels of alienation and 
willingness to engage in counter-terrorism/counter-extremism are largely descriptive. I also 
use statistical tests of mean differences to shed light on variations within British Muslims 
communities regarding immigration status, gender, age and education level. Immigration 
status of Muslims seems to matter when it comes to trust in authorities.67 Gender, age and 
education level are included because of the widespread view that young and marginalized 
Muslim men are more alienated and susceptible to anti-social behaviour than the rest of the 
Muslim population. If not stated otherwise, all variables were measured on a 7-point Likert 
scale and subsequently scored on a scale from 0 to 1. The third part of the analysis uses 
correlational methods (multiple regressions) to uncover the relationship between alienation 





The Level of British Muslims’ Alienation 
Extreme forms of alienation can be manifested by anti-mainstream and anti-social orientation. 
Therefore, I first asses the support for extremism and political violence among British 
Muslims. 
In Survey 2, 87 % of respondents somewhat agreed, agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement that “Islamist extremism seriously hurts Muslims living in the UK”, and 9 % 
neither agreed nor disagreed. Male respondents younger than 25 years did not differ 
significantly from other respondents. 
According to Survey 1, 64 % of the respondents somewhat agreed, agreed or strongly 
agreed that “Islamist extremism is a serious problem in the UK”, and 18% neither agreed nor 
disagreed. There was no statistical difference in case of young men under 25. 
Finally, the UK Citizenship Survey 2010-11 showed that 90% of Muslim respondents 
thought it was always or often wrong for people to use violent extremism to protest perceived 
injustice and unfairness. This response is not statistically different from responses given by 
non-Muslim respondents (although twice as many Muslims as non-Muslims answered, “I 
don’t know”). Muslim men under 25 were less likely to reject categorically the use of violent 
extremism (M=4.6, where 1 was “always right” and 5 was “always wrong” to use violent 
extremism; SD=.87) than other Muslim respondents (M=4.8; SD=.59); t(3369)=5.91, p=.000. 
However, non-Muslim young men showed the same tendency.   
Important indicators of less extreme forms of alienation can be found in the attitudes 
toward and trust in counter-terrorism policies and authorities. When it comes to trust in 
counter-terrorism policies, 53 % of respondents in Survey 1 somewhat agreed, agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement, “I trust the current government to act in my best interest in 
the area of counter-terrorism”. 20% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 27 % had the opposite 
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opinion. While there was no significant difference between young male and other 
respondents, female respondents and Muslims born in the UK were less likely to trust 
counter-terrorism policies than male respondents and Muslims born outside the country, 
respectively. Respondents with lower level of education tended to have higher trust in 
counter-terrorism policies than those with higher secondary and tertiary education, although 
the difference was only significant on a 90% confidence interval.  
Survey 1 also measured satisfaction with the government’s counter-terrorism policy. On 
this indicator, 44 % of respondents were satisfied (slightly, moderately or extremely), 26 % 
were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and 30 % were slightly, moderately or extremely 
dissatisfied. Young Muslim men did not report significantly different mean scores for 
satisfaction with the government’s counter-terrorism policy, nor were there differences 
pertaining to education level or place of birth. However, female respondents reported 
significantly lower means (M=.50; SD=.28) than males (M=.55; SD=.28); t(825)=2.30, p=.02. 
When it comes to trust, Survey 2 measured trust in government via an index (α =.71) based 
on replies to three items on a 7-point Likert scale: (1) “I trust the government to make 
decisions in a fair way”; (2) “I trust the government to do a good job in carrying out its 
responsibilities”; and (3) “You can’t really trust the government to do the right thing” 
(reversed values). The index was scored from 0 to 1 with a mean of .49 (SD=.22). Based on 
scores on the index, 44 % of respondents trusted the government, 39 % did not, and the 
remainder were neutral. The level of trust in the government among British Muslims found in 
the survey surpasses that of the general population reported in the same year.68 On this 
measure too, young Muslim men did not significantly differ in their responses from the rest of 
the sample.  
Trust in the police was measured in the UK Citizenship Survey 2010-11. Overwhelmingly, 
83 % of Muslim respondents indicated that they trust the police “a lot” or “a fair amount”. 
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This corresponded exactly to the level of trust expressed by Christian respondents and was not 
statistically different from that expressed by all other respondents (82 %). A one-way 
ANOVA test showed that young Muslim male respondents (under 25) reported lower trust in 
the police (M=.75, SD=.43) than other Muslim respondents (M=.83, SD=.37) [F(1, 3463) = 
12.46, p=.000]69, which is the same trend as within the non-Muslim sample.  
Finally, alienation linked to counter-terrorism/counter-extremism can be detected in the 
way Muslims perceived co-religionists who engage in countering Islamist extremism. In 
Survey 1, 45 % of respondents somewhat agreed, agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement, “I identify with Muslim activists who counter Islamist extremism”; 27 % had the 
opposite feeling, and the remainder neither agreed nor disagreed. Young male respondents did 
not significantly differ from the rest of the sample, but respondents who were male, born in 
the UK, highly educated and strongly identified as Muslims were more likely to agree with 
the statement than those who were female, born outside the UK, and with low education level, 
respectively. 
In addition, Survey 2 showed that 78 % of respondents somewhat agreed, agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement, “Muslims in the UK who actively take a stand against 
Islamist extremism are doing an important thing for the sake of fellow Muslims.” Only 8 % 
indicated the opposite, while the rest neither agreed nor disagreed. There was no statistically 
significant difference for young male respondents. However, respondents born in the UK and 
highly educated were more likely to agree with the statement than those born outside the 
country and with low education level, respectively. 
 
Willingness to Engage in Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Extremism 
All three surveys that are analysed in this paper included dependent variables on the spectrum 
between counter-extremism and counter-terrorism. 
16 
In Survey 1, respondents were asked to imagine a “deadly terrorist attack” in the UK, 
perpetrated by British Muslims, and to indicate how likely they were to engage in various 
forms of actions (against Islamist extremism) in response to the attack. Table 1 provides an 
overview of actions and responses.  
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
According to these results, more than 90 % (n=745) of the respondents were likely to take 
at least one of six actions against Islamist extremism in the aftermath of the hypothetical 
terrorist attack. About a third of the respondents (n=239) were likely to take all six actions. 
Based on a simple formative index of all types of action as the dependent variable, there was 
no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of engagement when it came to young 
Muslim men, Muslims born outside of the UK, or gender. Respondents with low level of 
education were more likely to take action than those with higher levels. 
In Survey 2, the dependent variable was based on a two-stage scenario. First, the 
respondents read the following text: “Imagine that a Muslim speaker is going to hold a public 
talk in your neighbourhood. The topics of the talk include the duty of Muslims to reject 
democracy and to punish homosexuals.” Then they were asked to indicate how likely they 
were to engage in five types of action, ranging from signing a petition against the event to 
physically obstructing it.  
An analysis of the results found that 69 % of the respondents were likely to take at least 
one action. Table 2 shows that the most frequent choice was the least demanding, signing a 
petition, as 58 % of the respondents were slightly, moderately or extremely likely to take this 
action. However, over one third of the respondents were likely to participate in a 
demonstration, oppose the speaker on social media or confront him in a face to face 
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discussion. In addition, almost a quarter of the respondents indicated a likelihood of 
physically obstructing the event.   
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
The second stage of the scenario was designed to present a more acute threat to public 
safety than a public talk. Following their replies to the first stage, the respondents were 
presented with the following text: “Imagine that the public talk described earlier happened as 
planned. A few days after the talk, you notice that an individual from your neighbourhood has 
suddenly become very vocal about the need to physically attack homosexuals, encouraging 
fellow Muslims to do so.” As before, respondents were asked to indicate how likely they were 
to take part in each of five types of action in response to this individual, such as making a 
report to the authorities (e.g., the police) or contacting a non-governmental organization that 
deals with extremism or similar issues. 
In the second stage of the scenario, 91 % of the respondents were likely to take at least one 
of the five actions. Table 3 shows that the most favoured type of action was to report the 
extremist individual to the authorities, such as the police. 64 % of the respondents were likely 
to take this course of action, with no significant difference in case of young Muslim men. 
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
As in Survey 1, neither young Muslim men nor Muslims born outside the UK reported 
significantly different scores compared to other respondents in either stage of the scenario 
(the dependent variables were simple formative indices of all types of actions in each stage of 
the scenario). In both stages, females were less likely to take action than male respondents. In 
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the second stage, respondents with low levels of education were less likely to take action than 
those with higher level of education. 
Finally, the Citizenship Survey 2010-11 offers a rare window to the actual, as opposed to 
the intended, engagement of British Muslims in countering violent extremism. The dependent 
variable in the survey was based on the following question: “In the last five years, have you 
done any of the things on this card in order to reduce or lower support for violent extremism 
in the name of religion?” 29 % of Muslim respondents replied affirmatively by choosing one 
or more types of action on the card. The most frequent type of action was disagreeing with 
“violent extremist beliefs” in private conversations with other people (n=810). The other 
actions were signing “a petition against violent extremism” (n=213), speaking out publicly 
against “people who encourage others to support violent extremism” (n=155), attending “a 
public meeting to talk about how the community can protect itself against violent extremism” 
(n=122), joining “a campaign against violent extremism” (n=60) and something else not on 
the card (n=3). In comparison, the level of actual past engagement among non-Muslim 
respondents (n=13,475) for the same question was 23 %, which is lower than among Muslim 
respondents.  
 
The Relationship Between Alienation and Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Extremism 
Engagement 
In this part of the analysis, I first present data from two survey questions that directly ask the 
respondents about the reason for their inactivity when it comes to taking action against 
Islamist extremism. Then, I investigate the correlation between aspects of alienation and 
intended and actual engagement in counter-terrorism/counter-extremism behaviour reviewed 
in the previous two parts of the results section.  
Survey 1, which presented the respondents with the fictional scenario of a terrorist attack in 
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the UK, included an experimental component reported in another study (author 2019a). In the 
experiment, the respondents were asked how likely they were to participate in a 
demonstration against Islamist extremism following the terrorist attack. The experiment was 
based on varying the source of the appeal to attend the demonstration (an appeal coming from 
the government versus a Muslim organization versus no specific appeal). Immediately after 
the respondents indicated their likelihood to participate in the demonstration, they were asked 
to explain their answer (i.e., why they indicated they were (un)likely to participate). Since the 
experiment found no significant effect of the source of the appeal, we can aggregate the data 
in this study. Out of 825 respondents, 201 indicated that they were (extremely, slightly or 
moderately) unlikely to attend the demonstration. Their written reasons for being unlikely to 
attend the demonstration were coded into more general categories, which are displayed in 
Figure 1.  
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
The most frequent categories are fear (e.g., of being attacked or misrepresented by the 
media), the feeling of low efficacy and principled refusal to participate in demonstrations. A 
category related to alienation is “Unfair responsibilisation”. It captures the anxiety of 
Muslims about being linked to Islamist terrorists through collective blame and responsibility. 
The following answer is an example of reasons that were coded in this category:  
 
Why would I do that, why we Muslims blame ourselves about terrorism, although 
it has nothing to do with Islam. I consider myself like any other British, Muslim 
or not, have nothing to feel bad about except feeling bad for losing innocent 
people, why do we have to explain ourselves except because the media want us to 
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feel that way.  
 
Another category linked to alienation is “Problem with the organizer”. This category includes 
answers that justify low likelihood of attending the demonstration by referring to the source of 
the appeal (in the experimental condition). In the condition where the government made the 
appeal, 19% (n=13) of respondents who were unlikely to participate justified it by expressing 
low trust in or outright hostility to the government. 
The UK Citizenship Survey 2010-11 also featured a question that directly asked the 
respondents about the reason for their inactivity when it comes to actions against violent 
extremism in the name of religion. Out of 2,465 Muslim respondents who said they had not 
taken any action in the preceding five years, most were coded under the category “it has never 
occurred to me to do anything” (n=980). Other reasons given were linked to efficacy, i.e., 
doubts that engagement would make a difference (n=431), not knowing what to do (n=360), 
low salience of the problem within one’s community (n=388) or in the UK (n=247), and fear 
of getting involved (n=135). Importantly, only 36 respondents chose the option “I don’t really 
care enough about violent extremism to do anything.” 
Finally, when it comes to the relationship between alienation and willingness to take action 
against Islamist extremism and terrorism, Table 4 shows four multiple regressions using all key 
variables from the three surveys and several demographic controls. The dependent variables in 
the first three models are based on simple formative indices of the combined willingness to 
engage in actions described in Tables 1, 2 and 3, respectively (see Appendix 1.1 for more 
details).  
 
[Table 4 near here] 
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Table 4 shows that low trust and satisfaction in counter-terrorism policies is associated with 
lower intention to engage in action against Islamist extremism. Distrusting police, on the other 
hand, increases the odds of taking action against Islamist extremism. Respondents who did not 
regard Islamist extremism as a serious problem, did not think it was hurtful to Muslims, did not 
identify with Muslim counter-extremism activists and did not consider the action of these 




The results are consistent with other surveys of British Muslims in that they portray Muslim 
communities as being opposed to political and religious violence.70 The tiny minority of British 
Muslims who are tolerant of the use of violence in certain cases appears to be proportionally 
comparable to a similar minority within the non-Muslim part of the society.71 Moreover, a large 
majority of British Muslims seems to look positively on other Muslims who are active in 
countering Islamist extremism.  
Admittedly, it is perfectly possible to reject (violent) extremism and still be alienated by 
counter-terrorism policies, even to the point of limited willingness to cooperate with authorities 
or engage independently in countering extremism and terrorism. This would be the main thrust 
of the arguments put forward by the existing literature on Muslims in the UK and other Western 
countries reviewed at the beginning of this article. However, the findings suggest that Muslim 
alienation is not as widespread as argued in the literature and public discourse. 
The results show that the majority of British Muslim trust the government’s counter-
terrorism policies, and the plurality is satisfied with these policies. The plurality of British 
Muslims also trust the government, while a vast majority trust the police. The approximately 
one third of British Muslims who seem to be dissatisfied with and distrust counter-terrorism 
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policies are not a negligible number and indicate possible alienation among sections of Muslim 
communities, although we lack comparable data from the non-Muslim majority population. 
Importantly, the results show that it is not the young Muslim men who are most distrusting of 
authorities and dissatisfied with counter-terrorism policies. Rather, other demographic 
indicators such as gender or immigration status seem to play more significant role. 
When it comes to Muslims’ willingness to take action against Islamist extremism, the 
findings show a very high level of readiness and comparatively (to the non-Muslim majority) 
high level of actual past engagement. That reporting a potential violent extremist to the 
authorities was the most favoured course of action among the respondents in Survey 2 
contradicts the worries expressed in the literature about reduced willingness of British Muslims 
to share intelligence. Again, there is little indication in the data that young Muslim men are less 
willing to take action against Islamist extremism, unlike Muslim women who seem to be less 
likely to engage – a finding worth investigating in future research. 
Finally, with respect to the link between alienation and engagement in counter-terrorism and 
counter-extremism, the analysis of an open-ended question in Survey 1 (Figure 1) showed that 
the direct involvement of the government in responsibilizing Muslims for Islamist terrorism 
and extremism likely has a counter-productive effect on a minority of Muslims. On the other 
hand, the question from the UK Citizenship Survey 2010-11 about reasons for not taking action 
against violent extremism in the name of religion did not reveal alienation (as opposed to, for 
example, lack of efficacy) as an important barrier to engagement. Admittedly, the fact that the 
respondents had to choose their answer from pre-determined categories could have affected 
these results. 
The correlational analysis of the relationship between aspects of alienation (such as trust in 
or satisfaction with counter-terrorism policies) and the willingness to take action against 
Islamist extremism supports the alienation narrative in that alienation can reduce the 
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willingness to engage in counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. However, the data also 
shows that respondents who are dissatisfied with or distrust counter-terrorism policies and the 
government still score means above the neutral values when it comes to taking action, including 
reporting a suspect to the authorities (see Appendix 1.2 for details). This suggests that alienation 
does not necessarily lead to disengagement and that alienated individuals are possibly still 
largely willing to stand up against Islamist extremism. The only exception was Stage 1 of the 
scenario in Survey 2, where respondents who do not trust the government scored mean values 
of intended action below the neutral point. A possible explanation is that the situation described 
to the respondents – a public lecture by an extremist – constitutes a less urgent threat in terms 
of potentially criminal or violent behaviour that would require an intervention. 
There are some limitations to this study. First, the highly charged issue of extremism and 
terrorism lends itself to social desirability bias, meaning that some respondents may give 
answers that they think are more acceptable to the researcher and the societal mainstream. The 
bias can be also motivated by fear of security services monitoring the answers or a wish to 
give a positive image of Muslim communities. Such bias is hard to avoid, but it should be less 
pronounced in the case of online, anonymous, self-administered surveys (Survey 1 and 
Survey 2).72 
Second, it can be argued that the non-probabilistic sampling method used to recruit 
respondents in Survey 1 and Survey 2 results in limited generalizability of the data to the 
British Muslim population. This might be true but hardly avoidable because a probabilistic 
sampling of a minority population is so costly that usually only the government could afford 
to collect data in this way. This is why this study included the government’s UK Citizenship 
Survey 2010-11. In addition, the bias due to the sampling method was not necessarily as high 
as it would be using a simple convenient sampling method, since both Survey 1 and Survey 2 
used quotas to reflect the population share in terms of age and gender. The surveys also 
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showed a diversity in respondents’ socio-economic background (e.g., 46% and 44%, 
respectively, had no or secondary education) and their responses to key variables. Financial 
remuneration in the case of the two surveys also helped to recruit respondents beyond those 
who would self-select because they were generally more pro-social and -volunteering (and 
hence more likely to help society by engaging in counter-terrorism). 
Third, one can wonder whether indicating willingness to engage in counter-extremism in a 
survey is the same as taking such action in the real life. Although it is true that intentions do 
not predict behaviour perfectly, past research has shown that behavioural intentions 
substantially predict actual behaviour.73 In addition, the UK Citizenship Survey 2010-2011 
provided measures of actual past behaviour rather than intentions.  
Fourth, some of the key aspects of alienation such as trust and satisfaction in counter-
terrorism policies lack comparison data from the non-Muslim majority. Such comparison 
would indicate whether the data reflect particular Muslim alienation due to disproportionate 
impact of counter-terrorism on Muslim communities or merely a shared sentiment across 
society.  
Finally, this study does not extensively disaggregate the extremely diverse British Muslim 
population to particular sub-groups, for example based on ethnic origin or sectarian creed, and 
therefore cannot make conclusions about their attitudes and behaviour.  
 
Conclusion 
The dominant narrative in the literature on the impact of counter-terrorism on Muslim 
communities in the UK and in the West more generally portrays Muslims as alienated and, 
consequently, reluctant to cooperate in counter-terrorism. This study provides rare large-N 
data to reassess and nuance the dominant narrative, which is largely based on qualitative 
small-N research. It finds that although a (non-negligible) minority shows signs of alienation, 
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most British Muslims are satisfied with and trust counter-terrorism policies, the government 
and the police. Their level of willingness to take action against Islamist extremism is also 
high. The study further confirms that aspects of alienation correlate with reduced willingness 
to take action against Islamism extremism but do not necessarily lead to passivity or 
disengagement in terms of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. 
This article joins the few existing quantitative studies of Muslim alienation in the 
framework of counter-terrorism and in so doing contributes to reassessing what perhaps is an 
overly gloomy Muslim alienation narrative. One should bear in mind, though, that this 
narrative describes a dynamically changing social reality and could have been more justified 
in certain periods. The British government, like many others, has implemented counter-
terrorism policies in response to Islamist terrorism in a trial-and-error way. Partially informed 
by failures and partially by academic research as well as the rulings of the highest British and 
European courts, the policies and their communication to the public have evolved. For 
example, the early Prevent focused exclusively on Muslim communities and used highly 
securitized language, but now it covers all types of violent extremism (e.g., far right) and is 
couched in the language of safeguarding. In addition, the threat of Islamist extremism may 
have gradually dawned on many British Muslims, especially in the light of high-profile 
attacks conducted in the UK and Europe in the last couple of years and hundreds of British 
volunteers joining ISIS. Therefore, what may have been alienating ten years ago might be 
more accepted today. This study should not be viewed as a rebuttal to the alienation narrative 
but as friendly invitation to subject it to more rigorous and nuanced investigation. 
Further research on counter-terrorism and Muslim communities in the West should start 
with sharpening the conceptualization of alienation and its operationalization in order to 
increase the internal validity of studies that attempt to measure alienation and its impact. To 
be able to generalize and to enhance the ecological validity of their studies, researchers should 
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complement in-depth qualitative analyses with the use of large-N data, preferably 
representative of the Muslim population. A particularly promising research strategy, which 
does not require costly nationally representative surveys, would be to employ experimental 
designs. Experiments are almost absent in studies of the effects of counter-terrorism policies 
on Muslims, and they can help to uncover socio-economic and psychological factors that 
make alienation and its effects more or less pronounced. This would push the boundaries of 
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